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NOTES.
CARRIERs-DISCRIMINATION--EXTENSION OF CRE iT-At common law, the carrier has the option to demand payment of freight
in advance or on delivery. And, as there is a lien on the goods to
secure the payment of charges, it is often a matter of indifference
whether the freight is collected at the beginning or end of the transportation.' The law has, therefore, always recognized that the carrier could exercise one option or the other, according to the convenience of the parties, the course of trade, or the sufficiency of the
goods to pay the accruing charges. What was true between the
carrier and the shipper, was likewise true between the carrier and
its connections. But there is a conflict in the authorities as to how
far this common-law right has been modified by those statutes,
which, while not requiring absolute uniformity, do prohibit unjust
discrimination. On the one hand, it is argued that the carrier has

"Wells v. Thomas, 27 Mo. 17 (1858); Potts v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
131 Mass. 455 (1881).
(430)
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the right to make connections, establish joint routes and through
rates for the purpose of facilitating and increasing its business. As
an incident of this right, it is said that the carrier may enforce the
common-law rule and accept goods with or without prepayment of
freight, its decision being determined by the relation between the
two companies, the amount of business interchanged, the solvency
of the carrier against which the balance generally exists, and other
like matters, which, while aiding some of the carriers, do not increase the rates charged to the shipper, in whose interest the laws
against discrimination have been passed. The federal courts hold
that such difference in treatment is not an unjust discrimination,
prohibited by statute.2 A different view of the question has been
taken by other courts, including the Supreme Court of Georgia,"
which held that the statute, requiring railroads to furnish customary facilities for the interchange of freight, empowering the commission to prevent unjust discrimination, authorized that body to
pass an order directing the Wadley Southern Railway to discontinue the practice of requiring the Mfacon and Dublin Railroad to
prepay freight to Adrian, while making no such demand from the
Central of Georgia Railway. The Supreme Court of the United
States said that this decision of the Georgia Supreme Court was
controlling, so far as the state law was concerned, and the only
question for its consideration was whether such an order violated
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Wadley Southern Railroad contended, in effect, that without due process of law the order deprived it of the liberty of contract, took from it a valuable right of property and deprived it of
the profit it could have made in the exercise of the well recognized
common-law right to demand prepayment of freight from one connection without being compelled to make similar demands from all
other connections. The Supreme Court ruled on this branch of the
case that the order did not, as claimed, interfere with the carrier's
legitimate right of manigement, nor deprive it of any right of contract. It did not require the Wadley Railroad to receive without
the prepayment of freight, goods whose value was insufficient to
pay charges, if the consignee should decline to accept them on arrival. Neither did it deprive the Wadley Southern of the right to
solicit and encourage shipments via the Central of Georgia Railway. The imperative quality of the order was to pronibit the Wadley Railroad from favoring one carrier to the injury of another
' Little Rock, etc.. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 63 Fed. Rep. 775 (1894) ; Gulf, etc.,
R. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 407 (1898); Gamble-Robinson Commission Co. v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 168 Fed. Rep. 161 (igog).
'Adams Express Co. v. State, 161 Ind. 328 (19o3). A statute in this case
expressly forbade extending audit to some but not all shippers.
'State of Georgia v. Wadley Southern Ry. Co., 137 Ga. 497 (I912).
'Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. State of Georgia, 235 U. S. 65r (1915).
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and the public, where the conditions as to service were substantially
alike in both cases. And certainly, it would seem that a regulation
is reasonable which requires, not that a carrier shall enter into a
specific contract with a connection, but if it voluntarily extends
facilities and privileges to one of its connections, that it must also,
under Substantially the same conditions, give the same facilities and
privileges to the other connection, where the result of its favoritism
is the injury to the public.'
prohibits "any
Section Three of the Interstate Commerce Act
'7
undue or unreasonablle preference or advantage." What is undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage is not defined by the act,
but it has been held to consist of doing or allowing to one party or
place what is denied to another party or place under substantially
8
The Gamble-Robinson
the same circumstances and conditions.
Case holds that it is not giving "any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage" within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce
Act, for a carrier to require payment in advance of some customers
for freight charges and to extend credit to others similarly situated.9 In the case of Little Rock & Memphis Railroad Company
v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, the common-law
right of a carrier to require payment in advance for freight charges
of some customers and to extend credit to others was recognized,
and it was held that the act of an interstate carrier in requiring prepayment of freight charges by one connecting carrier and giving
credit to other connecting carriers was not subjecting the former
to an "undue or unreasonable disadvantage" within the meaning of
the act. But in Hocking Valley Railway Company v. United
States,"' a railroad company practiced discrimination in violation
of the Interstate Commerce Act, where, at the time of the monthly
settlement, it received a shipper's note in payment of freight
charges, while in transactions with other shippers, the railroad exacted payment in cash at the time of the monthly settlement. The
scope of this decision was confined to cases where requiring the
prepayment is used as a precaution to insure the payment of the
full legal rate. The case, however, contains language casting doubt
upon the hitherto established doctrine that the mere fact that credit
is extended to some shippers and refused to others is not sufficient
to constitute discrimination.
'Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver R. Co., zio U. S. 667 (1884).
'Interstate Commerce Act, Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, §36, 24 Stat. 38o (U. S.
Comp. St. 19OI, p. 356), as amended by Act June 29, i9o6, 4. J59, §2, 34 St.,
386 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. i911, p. i)2).
Supra, n. 2.
*Gamble-Robinson Commission Co. v. C. & N. IV. Ry. Co., 168 Fed. Rep.
161 (19O9).
lSuPra, n. z
"Hocking Valley v. United States, 21o Fed. Rep. 735 (1914).

NOTES

In view of the I-locking Valley Case, and the decision reached
by the Supreme Court of Georgia, sustained by the United States
Supreme Court, as to its constitutional aspect, it is highly probable
that the Interstate Commerce Commission will hold that the extension of credit to one shipper or connection and the refusil to extend
to others similarly situated constitutes unjust discrimination. The
result reached in the Wadley Southern Case is very desirable, as it
is manifest that extending credit to one shipper and not to another,
gives the favored shipper a substantial advantage and seems clearly
an unjust discrimination.
G. W.K.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-RESTRAINT UPON

COMMERCE-An Iowa statute' declared that no foreign corporation,
for other than religious and charitable purposes "shall* transact any
business within this State [Iowa] nor sue or maintain any action at
. . until it
law or otherwise, in any of the courts of this State
shall have filed in the office of the Secretary of State an authenticated copy of its charter or articles of incorporation . . . and
also unless it shall have appointed a resident agent upon whom process may be served in any action to which it may be a party and shall
have filed an authenticated copy of such appointment in the office of
the Secretary of State and of the register of deeds of the county
where the agent resides."
The general rule of constitutional law is that a State can prescribe any condition it may desire as a condition precedent to the
right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders,* but
this is modified by the rule that a State may not attach as a condition
something which is outside the limits which the Constitution of the
United States places upon State action.8 And subject to the same limitation is the rule that a State may restrict the right of a foreign corporation to sue in its courts. 4 An excellent example of these doctrines
and their application may be found in the recent case of Sioux Remedy Company v. Cope,5 where the facts briefly were as follows: The
plaintiff was a South Dakota corporation which had shipped goods
of the value of eighty dollars to the defendants in Iowa. The action
was brought in a State court in Iowa, and the defendant interposed
a plea that it could not be maintained because the plaintiff had failed

'Rev. Codes, i9o3, -883.
' Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. z868); Hooper v. California, 155
U. S. 648 0894).
' Blake v. McClung, i7"2 U. S. 239 0898); Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Kansas, 216 U. S. i (I9o9).
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. Sig (U. S. 1839); Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., i9' U. S. 373 (19o3).
'235 U.

S. 197 (1914).

-
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to comply with the Iowa statute. The Supreme Court of Iowa held
the plea good, whereupon the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States on the ground that this statute was repugnant to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. In supporting
this contention, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, for the court, held that
the limitation arising from the Commerce Clause is a well recognized exception to the general rule that a State can exclude a foreign
corporation and "that the right to demand and enforce payment for
goods sold in interstate commerce, if not a part of such commerce,
is so directly connected with it and is so essential to its existence
and continuance that the imposition of unreasonable conditions upon
this right must necessarily operate as a restraint or burden upon
interstate commerce."
This interpretation of the statute clearly falls within the rule
laid down in Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas: "If
the statute, reasonably interpreted, either directly or by its necessary operation, burdens interstate commerce it must be adjudged to
be invalid, whatever may have been the purpose for which it was
enacted, and although the company may do both interstate and intrastate business. This court has repeatedly adjudged that in all such
matters the judiciary will not regard mere forms, but will look
through forms to the substance of things."
In contradistinction to this decision, it has been held by the
Supreme Court that where a State statute forbids a foreign corporation from doing business until similar conditions are complied
with, but says nothing about the right to sue in the State courts, that
one act such as existed in the principal case is not business in interstate commerce, and therefore in the Cooper case the majority of
the court refused to pass on the constitutionality of the State act.
To decide whether or not a foreign corporation is 'or is not
engaged in interstate commerce is a very difficult proposition and
apparently every case must be decided on its own facts. In the following instances it has been held by the Supreme Court of the
United States that the foreign corporation was so engaged: Correspondence schools,8 telegraph companies,9 telephone companies,
probably. 0 Likewise it has been held by a State court that a foreign corporation engaged in furnishing milling machinery and adjusting it in the mill is engaged in an act of interstate commerce.'
And that the execution of a canvagser's bond to a foreign corporation is such a transaction." On the other hand, State courts have
*Supra, n. 3.
'Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 1I3 U. S. 737 (1884).
'International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 (19o9).

"Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas. supra, n. 3.
"Richmond v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 174 U. S. 761 (1899).
"Milan

filling Co. v. Gorton, 83 Tenn. s91 (894).

" Gunn v. White Sewing 1Machine Co., 57 Ark. 24 (1892).

NOTES

held that-a loan of money to a citizen of a State by a foreign corpo
ration is not interstate commerce,' 3 and that a foreign corporation in
the press dispatch business is not so engaged."' At all events, if thefact is once proved that the particular transaction is interstate commerce the Supreme Court wiIl declare any State act unconstitutional which imposes a burden upon interstate commerce.

I.W.L.
DESCENT-EFFECT OF MURDER BY HEIR-The

right of one who

has been convicted of murder of a member of his family to claim
under the intestate laws from the murdered person Jias arisen in a
recent Illinois decision.' Ray Pfanschmidt murdered his father, his
mother and his sister. The case came up on the question of the right
of the murderer to inherit, as heir, the property of those he mur-

dered. The rights of creditors of the murderer were involved. Because of the interest which necessarily attaches to the ancient doctrines of forfeiture and escheat, so familiar to the common law, one
is prompted to examine into the effect which they have had upon
the decisions of the present day.
Forfeiture of lands to the king was prevalent among the Saxons and existed in their law as part of the punishment for the criminal offense committed. Itwas a prerogative vested in the crown.
In feudal times, however, escheat to the lord was the practice and
this differed greatly from forfeiture to the king. The feudal doctrine of escheat upon attainder was that the blood of the vassal who
had committed the felony was so corrupted that he was no longer
fit for service for his lord, and, of course, he had held his feud only
durn bene se gesserit. Upon proof of guilt the estate reverted instantly to the lord of the fee, and the inheritable quality of the vassal's blood was extinguished and blotted out forever. It was this
law of escheat to the l6rd that, at the time of the -Conquest, was
brought into England, there to meet and generally supersede the
Saxon law of forfeiture to the king. Summing up the subject of
escheat by attainder, Blackstone says: "It appears that a person attainted is neither allowed to retain his former estate nor to inherit
a future one, nor to transmit any inheritance to his issue, either.immediately from himself or mediately through himself from any
remote ancestor; for his inheritable blood, which is necessary either
to hold, to take or to transmit any feudal property, is blotted out,
corrupted and extinguished forever; the consequence of which is
" Nelms v. Edinburg-American Land Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 157- (189o),
" Associate Press v. Com., 6o S. W. Rep. 295 (Ky. igox). It is submitted, however, that this is doubtful in the light of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the correspondence school and telegraph cases, supra.
'Wall v. Pfanschmidt, io6 N. E. Rep. 785 (1914).
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that estates thus impeded in their descent result back and escheat to
the lord."2 But as the feudal power began to break down, this corruption of blood and the accompanying hardship upon those who
would ordinarily take from the offender began to be regarded with
ill favor. From the time of Henry VIII, whenever a new felony
was created Parliament declared that it should not carry with it
corruption of blood. Finally, in i814,3 corruption of blood was
abolished in all cases except for the crimes of treason, petit treason
and murder. Then by the Forfeiture Act of 187o,4 the entire doctrine of attainder, forfeiture and corruption of blood was abolished,
except forfeiture as the result of outlawry. Thus by statute the
common law of England, at least, has been freed of the feudal traditions of forfeiture and esibeat because of corruption of blood.
However, in reviewing the recent English decisions, we find
that in spite of the Forfeiture Act the English courts have adhered
to the old common law, it being naturally repugnant to one's sense
of justice that a man should be allowed to inherit from one whom
he has murdered. Thus it was held in 183o' that those representing
and claiming under one convicted and executed for a felony could
not recover insurance. The decision was put upon the ground of
public policy, that one should not profit by his own wrong, and many
courts have followed this reasoning. Then in 1892, after the passage
of the Forfeiture Act, the leading case of Cleaver v. Mfutual Reserve
Fund Life Association6 was decided. Here the assured was
poisoned by his wife, who was beneficiary under the policy. Lord
Justice Fry upheld Lord Esher in refusing to allow the enforcement
of the trust created by the policy in favor of the wife. Amicable
Society v. Bolland -,as relied on, and Lord Esher said, inter alia.
"that the person who commits murder, or a person claiming under
him or her, should be allowed to benefit by his or her criminal act
would no doubt be contrary to public policy." There are other
British and Colonial cases following the Cleaver Case and all are
decided upon this common-law maxim which decried the equity of
allowing anyone to profit by his own wrong.7
In this country the decisions have gone both ways. Riggs v.
Palmer appears to be the leading case denying the murderer his
property. Here the doctrine of public policy was again resorted to
and reliance placed upon a United States Supreme Court decision '
'Sharswood's Blackstone's Corn., vol. 1, bk. 2, p. 251.
'54 Geo. III, e-45.
l33 and 34 Vie. C.23.
'Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh, N. S. 194.
4 [1892] 1 Q. B. 147.
'Lundy v. Lundy, 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 65o (1895); in re Cash, 3o N. Z. L

577 (911).
* i N. Y. so6 (889).
IN. Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (x886).

NOTES

and the court went on to say that it was not the intention of the legislature, in making laws providing for the devolution of property,
that such laws should operate in favor of one who murdered his ancestor or beneficiary in order more speedily to come into the decedent's estate. This case is representative of one line of decisions"

which holds that to permit a person who commits murder,
or any person claiming under him, to benefit by his crimOn the other
inal act, would be contrary to public policy.
hand, the weight of authority appears to be in accord with the principal case, and many States hold' that where, as is always the case,
specific statutes govern the descent of property of one dying intestate and there is nothing therein to justify exclusion, the one upon
whom the law casts the property cannot, because of the murder by
him of the ancestor or testator, be deprived of it by the court. The
first important case was that of Owens v. Owens,' decided in i888.
There it was held that a woman who had been committed to the
State's prison as accessory before the fact to her husband's murder,
was not thereby deprived of her dower. The court went on to state
that "the only statutory provision which, for criminal misbehavior
bars an action prosecuted for the recovery of dower, is where she
shall commit adultery and shall not be living with her husband at
his death." It is on this theory that the courts following this case
pin their faith, that since punishments are provided for murder,
there is every reason to believe that the legislature did not intend
that a murderer should be further punished by being deprived of
his or her property, even if such property was derived from the victim of the murder. And they go on to say23 that where the legislature has declared certain intestate laws it is not to be presumed that
they are not meant to apply when the beneficiary feloniously kills
the deceased from whom the inheritance is derived. The cases are
well summed up by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Carpenter's Appeal," where, in. speaking of the statutes relative to punishment for murder and intestate statutes, the court criticizes the
public policy theory: "How can there be a public policy leading to
one conclusion when there is a positive statute directing a precisely
opposite result? . . . The intestate laws cast the estate upon certain designated persons and this is absolute and peremptory, and the
estate cannot be diverted from those persons and given to other per'Perry v. Strawbridge, 2o Mo. 621 (i9o7); Schmidt v. Northern Life
Ass., 112 Iowa, 41 (i9oo); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393 (19o3); Ellerson v.

Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149 (i8g5).
U Owens v. Owens, ioo N. C. 24o (1888); Deem v. Milliken, s3 Ohio 668
(1895) ; Carpenter's Appeal, 170 Pa. 203 (i895); McAllister v. Fair, 72 kan.
533 (xgo6) ; De Graffenreid v. Iowa Trust Co., 2o Okl. 687 (Io8).
12
Supra, n. II.
'Shellenberger v. Ramson, 41 Neb. 631 (1894); McAllister v. Fair, 72
Kan. 533 (x9o6).
" i7o Pa. 203 (i89s).
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sons without violating the statute. There can be no public policy
which contravenes the positive language of a statute."'15 Thus it
can be seen that the cases in this country divide on this question of
public policy. Those cases following Riggs v. PalnerG recognize
the right of the courts to declare a thing to be against the'public
policy of the State. The other cases hold that, though this may be
so in certain cases, nevertheless where the legislature has once dealt
with a subject, as when as here it has declared where the property
of an intestate shall go and what the punishment for murder shall
be, it is not its intention that the courts shall further develop the
subject and make an exception when the deceased's heir shall take
nd add further punishment to murder by denying the murderer
that property which, as heir of the deceased, would naturally come
to him. In the principal case the .statutes of Illinois provide that
the real and personal estates of any person dying shall descend to
his children and their descendants.' 7 This, the court held, in line
with authorities supra,'8 expressed the intent of the legislature and
excluded any implied condition such as that if the inheritance came
to one who had feloniously caused the decedent's death, the statute
should not apply.
The courts have not always laid stress upon the question of the
intent manifested by the murder. Perhaps it is presumed in most
cases that if a man murders a member of his family it is for the purpose of inheriting his or her property. This being usually the case,
those courts which allow the property to devolve upon the murderer
do not hold otherwise merely because it is expressly shown that the
murder was committed for the very purpose of inheriting the decedent's property."
H. I.
DIVORCE-EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF & DECREE OF DivoRcE

demand for uniform divorce legislation
-JURISDICTION-The
would seem to be justified when one considers the great conflict
among the decisions and the complexity of the legal question involved. Because of the diverse grounds of divorce in different jurisdictions, the different modes of procedure required to secure a
decree, the different attitudes taken toward the question by the
courts of different jurisdictions and the resulting confusion in the
cases, there is a haze of uncertainty about the whoie question that
would clearly be remedied by uniformity of procedure and determination.
'At p. 2A&

" Supra, n.&
"Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, e. 39.
ON. Ii.
170 Pa. 203, 72 Kan. 533, 2o Okl. 687, supra, n.ii.

NOTES

The main reason for the confusion that now exists seems to be
the complex legal nature of the marriage relation. This relation
involves not only the personal rights of the parties to the marriage
toward each other, but also the marriage relation or status itself. In
a suit for divorce, although the personal rights of the parties are affected, the subject matter of the litigation is the marriage status. By
the better view, a suit for divorce is an action quasi in ren. The
res is the marriage status. The jurisdiction of a court over such
status depends upon its situs. The situs of the marriage status depends upon the domicile of the parties. Ordinarily the domicile of
a wife is that of her husband. But, as we shall see, under some circumstances a wife may have a domicile separate from that of her
husband. It is because of the complex situations that may arise out
of the foregoing legal principles that we find so many conflicting
views and decisions as to the effect of a decree of divorce.
As to the intra-territorial effect of a decree of divorce there is
no question. The principle that each State has the sovereign power
to determine the status of all persons within its boundaries, either
permanently or temporarily, subject only to constitutional restrictions, is well established. But the extra-territorial effect of a decree
of divorce would seem to depend upon whether the court granting it
has such jurisdiction of the marriage status, the res of the action,
that other States will recognize it as a valid judgment binding everyThe
where, provided, of course, that it is binding where made.
question may arise in three different situations.
i. Both parties to the marriage sought to be dissolved may -be
domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court'granting the decree.
In such case the court has complete jurisdiction of both the parties
and the res and therefore the decree, valid in the State where made,
will be valid and binding everywhere.' This is true even though the
parties are not actually present at the time of the decree, so long as
they have their domicile there.3
2. Where neither party is domiciled in the State granting the
divorce it seems equally clear that the decree will have no extraterritorial effect.' Some courts modify this rule to the extent of
holding that voluntary submission by the parties to the decision of a
court estops them from afterward denying the court's jurisdiction
elsewhere.5
3. It is where only one of the parties is domiciled in the State
of divorce that great difficulty arises. In such case the divorcing
'Minor on Conflict of Laws, §87.
' Barber v. Root, io Mass. 26o (813); Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878):
SLoker v. Gerald, 157 Mass. 42 (1892).
'Watkins v. Watkins, 125 Ind. 163 (i8go); Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich. 117
(1883); Neff v. Beauchamp, 74 Ia. 92 (1887) ; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181
U. S. 179 (19oo).
'Ellis v. Ellis, 55 Minn. 401 (1893); Ellis v. White, 61 Ia. 644 (1883).
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court has partial, but not complete, jurisdiction of the marriage
status. Yet, owing to the nature of the marriage relation, no decree of divorce can be made affecting the status of one party without
equally affecting that of the other. The question then arises, under
such circumstances, what is necessary to give the court granting the
divorce such jurisdiction as will induce the courts of other jurisdictions to recognize its judgment as valid and binding upon them, it
being an established rule of private international law that a decree
of a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, if valid where made, is valid and binding everywhere, 6 provided
it be not against the public policy or morality of the State asked to
recognize it." There is further involved, as between the States of
the Union, the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal Constitution, which requires that a decree rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, unless void where rendered, is conclusive in every
other State as to the matters decided. But this provision is qualified
in that it does not prevent an inquiry into the competency of the jurisdiction of the court granting the decree.- If the court has not
competent jurisdiction, its judgment need not be given "full faith
and credit".'
In the recent case of Gildersleeze v. Gildersleeve' the parties
were domiciled in Connecticut. The husband left the wife and went
to South Dakota, where he resided for more than a year. During
that time he instituted proceedings for divorce in that State, personal service in such action being made upon the wife in Connecticut. Although there was evidence from which the court might have
found that the plaintiff took up his residence in South Dakota for
the mere purpose of securing the divorce, the court held it incumbent upon them, as an act of interstate comity, to accord to the
South Dakota decree full recognition, there being no ground of public policy or morality involved to induce a different course. This
decision is in accord with the general rule that a foreign divorce
granted to one party by a court having jurisdiction of0 the subject
matter and of the parties is binding on the other party." As above
stated, the question then resolves itself into one of determining
what is necessary to give the court granting the decree competent
'Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 (1856) ; Coddington v. Coddington, 1o Ab.
Prac. 450 (N. Y. 186o) ; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8 (869) ; Felt v. Felt
57 N. J. Eq. ioi (1898).
aKinney v. Com., 30 Gratt. 858 (Va. 1878); Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625
O8W8).
' Cheever v. Wilson, supra, n. 6; Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass.
223 (i889); Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich. 117 (1883); Watkins v. Watkins,
supra, n. 4.

$Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra, n. 4.

At. Rep. 684 (Conn. 1914).
" Ditson v. Ditson, supra. n. 6; Coddington v. Coddington, supra, n. 6;
Cheever v. Wilson, supra, n. 6; Felt v. Felt supra, n. 6.
'92

NOTES
jurisdiction. It is obvious that in order to bring suit, the party seeking the divorce must be subject to the jurisdiction of the court to
which he looks for relief. It would seem that if the plaintiff is bona
fide domiciled in the State of the forum, residence of the defendant
therein is not necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court to dissolve the marriage."1 But it seeras equally clear that if the plaintiff
has taken up a residence in the State of the forum for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, it
is not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the plaintiff."
Especially is this true where the cause of divorce set up is one not
recognized by the law of the domicile he has left.1 ' While it is the
general rule that the domicile of a wife is that of her husband, it is
well established that a married woman may acquire a domicile separate from that of her husband when it is necessary for her to do
so because of his conduct.' So also, if the husband deserts his wife
and removes to a foreign State, the wife may remain and retain her
domicile. 1s

It being clear in a specified case that the court has jurisdiction
of the plaintiff, the question remains as to what is necessary to confer upon it jurisdiction over the defendant sufficient to make its decree binding extra-territorially. The broad rule would seem to be
that jurisdiction of the person of the defendant may be acquired by
service of process in any constitutional mode recognized by the

statutes of the State granting the divorce. Thus, by many of the
decisions, constructive service of process on a non-resident defendant is sufficient to give extra-territorial effect to the decree. 1 , Some
States qualify the broad rule as stated."

Still others deny it in

Loker v. Gerald, supra, n. 3; Ditson v. Ditson, supra, n. 6; Cheever v.
Wilson, supra, n. 6; Felt v. Felt, supra, n.6.
"Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 (1817); Gettys v. Gettys, 3 Lea.
26o (Tenn. 1879); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 58 N. J. Eq. 563 0899); s. c. on
appeal, 18i U. S. 179 (igo); Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 589 (x896).
"Cummington v. Belchertown, supra, n.7; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass.
is6 (1877).
"'Smith v. Smith, 43 La. Ann. T140 (x89x); Atherton v. Atherton, 155
N. Y. 129 (1893); Cheever v. Wilson, supra, n.6.
"Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867); Campbell v. Campbell, go Hun. 233
(N. Y. i895); Sewall v. Sewall, supra, n.13.
1
Ditson v. Ditson, supra, n. 6; Kline v. Kline, 57 Ia. 386 (i88i);
Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 265 (1894); Thompson v. Thompson, 91
Ala. 591 (189o); Hibbish v. Hittle, 145 Ind. 59 (1895); Rogers v. Rogers, 56

Kans. 438 (1895). Some of these decisions hold that while the decree
operates as a binding and valid dissolution of the marriage status, it does

not extra-territorially affect the property rights of the defendant, or the
status of children of the marriage: Thurston v. Thurston, supra; Rogers

v. Rogers, supra; Kline v. Kline, supra.
"Van Orsdal v. Van Orsdal, 67 Ia. 35 (88s); Smith v. Smith, suprao, n.
r4. These decisions recognized decrees on constructive notice granted in
other states with similar legislation.
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toto.'1 Such a decree, however, is not entitled to recognition under
the ''full faith and credit" clause of the Federal Constitution.' Another, and, it is submitted, more reaonable rule requires some.kind
of personal service on the non-resident defendant." Such a rule
prevents the defendant from the granting of a decree against him of
which he or she is entirely ignorant, or at least requires that the
plaintiff show bona ffdes by attempting personal service at the place
the defendant was last known to be.' The principal case is in accord with this rule, which is just and equitable to all concerned. In
only one jurisdition does the rule seem to he more strict than as
just stated. In-.ew York even personal service on a non-resident
defendant-has ben held not to confer jurisdiction on the foreign
court so as to. entitle its decree to recognition.2 2 It would seem,
however, that sificient protection is given to the rights of the defendant without iequiring him or beto be an actual resident of the
i service is made. Of course,
State of thw:for*r, provided
ie.nral appeaaiee entered by auoa-resident defendant, either in
persow or by attorney, gives the court jurisdiction of such defendant.Y And a decree upon such appearance by a defendant is entitled
to full faith and credit under the Federal Constitution. 1
R.M.G.
TORTS-PROXIMATE

AND REMOTE CAUSE-INTERVENING

AcTs

TnmPn PERSON-The question of how far a wrongdoer should
be held responsible for the results of his wrongful act when there
has been some wrongful or negligent interference by a third person
OF

A

between the original %wrongand the resulting injury, is from its very
nature a complicated one. It is even more so today than formerly,
for so far-reaching and varied in a highly developed civilization are

the results of what might seem to be the least important act, that
every wrong drags after it a chain of more or less disastrous con-

"Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 5s87 (894); UcCreery v. Davis, 44 S. C.

195 (1894); Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 5t.e9@); Zerfas' Appeal, 135
Pa. 5?2 (i8go); ein's Estate, 22 Tra. SWer. M & (igo3).
Cf. Atherton v. Atherton,
"Haddock v. Haddock, 2o U. S. 562 (1906).
181 U. S. iss (igoi), where the wife deserted and the husband sued for.
divorce, the only service on the wife being an attempted service through the

mails, whic: failed. It was held that the wife had never acquired a new
domicile, and the decree was therefore binding extra-territorially under the
full faith aud credit clause of the Federal Constitution.
0 Felt v. Felt, supra, i. 6; Loker v. Gerald, jmwa, n.3; Harding Y. Ales,
9 Me. 4o (632).
lu Ather~ton v. Atherta, suPre, tt.
x9.
"Williams v. Wilarm, 130 N. Y. x93 (i3pt); Matter of Kiamll, lis

N. Y. 62 (MA).
"Cheever v. Wilson, supra, n. 6; Arrimgtoe v. Arrington, =o X. C. 494
(t889).
"Cheever v. Wilson, supra, L 6; Lynde v. Lynde, z62 N. Y. 4o5 (igoo).

NOTES
sequences, which in tnth might well be ascribed to the initial tortfeasor. It is therefore not surprising to find no little amount of confusion in the cases, especially in view of the fact that the law in this
respect is still in a more or less transitory condition.
There are two extreme positions and between them is the ground
upon which is waged the struggle for a satisfactory mean. The one,
that if the original wrong be the causa sine qua ion, the wrongdoer
should be held responsible, is obviously too broad; the other, that
the defendant should be liable only if his act be the actual immediate
cause, is, on the contrary, as plainly too narrow. What, then, should
be the compromise?
The early tendency undoubtedly was to restrict liability, and
any wrongful intervention relieved the original tort-feasor. The
theory was that where there were two successive wrongdoers, the
one nearest the resulting injury should suffer. The courts would
not look behind the wrong of the intervening agent and determine
what wrong of the defendant had given occasion for the third person's wrong to the plaintiff. This was true even in cases where the
third person could not be found. As late as i8o6, Lord Ellenborough refused to set aside the nonsuit of a journeyman who had lost
his position as a result of the defendant's slanderous words, because
his master had wrongfully broken his contract to discharge him.1
But the broad principle of this case, though it has been cited with
approval upon several later occasions, 2 has not been followed to any
extent, except in one class of case, zvi., that in which slander is repeated.3 In all other cases the tendency is toward a much wider
scope of responsibility, and no longer is it always an excuse that
some subsequent wrong of a third person has intervened.
The idea soon crept in that if a person not legally responsible
should intervene, such as a child or a lunatic, the original wrongdoer
should not be relieved. From this it was but a step to the position
that where a third person, in an attempt to avoid the defendant's
wrong by removing a condition that- interferes with the enjoyment
of his rights and privileges, negligently causes the plaintiff's injury,
the defendant nevertheless should be liable. This was recognized in
the case of Clark v. Chambers,4 where a third person removed an
'Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East. x (Eng. i8o6).
'Crain v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522 (N. Y. 1844); Hughes v. McDonough, 43
N. J. L 459 (188 ); Cate v. Cate, so N. H. i44 (1870); Fawcett v. R. R, 24
W. Va. 759 (884).

See also Cooley on Torts (3rd Ed.), p. iot, and Currier

v. McKee, 99 Me. 364 (1904).
'There is an arbitrary exception to the modern conception of proximate'
and remote cause in the case of an originator of slander or libel, who is not
liable for the results of its unauthorized repetition, no matter how dearly
such repetition may fall within the causation sequence. See the case of
Shoepflin v. Coffey, x62 N. Y. 12 (igoo), and Blake Odgers' "Libel and
Slander" (4th ed.), pp. 388-389, where it is said, "The repetition by a free
agent
is neither a direct nor a natural result."
4

L R, 3 Q. B. Div. 327 (1878).
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obstruction in the highway left by the defendant, but negligently
placed it across the foot-path; thereby causing injury to the plaintiff." Also the idea was soon recognized that where a stranger acts
negligently in an effort to make safe a condition created by the defendant's wrong and harmful to the public, the defendant should be
held, notwithstanding, for the resulting injury.' And the position
was also taken that the defendant should be liable even where
strangers act negligently in assisting one injured by the defendant's
wrong.?
It was not long moreover before the courts came to regard even
the fact that strangers have intervened negligently with no color
of cause whatever for the interference, as insufficient in itself to
So the "'hahituallv thoughtless,
break the chain of causation.
though legally culpable, inadvertences of careless people"' are not
sufficient to render the defendant free from liability and his act is
considered the proximate cause despite the 'occasional negligence
which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life" which might
have intervened. Cases of this sort crowd the reports and are
invariably disposed of in accordance with this view. In this category fall the many cases where workmen are injured by the negligent use by fellow employees of defective tools and machinery;'*
where materials carelessly piled or placed in dangerous positions
at e disturbed by the negligence of others;" or where elevator doors,
left unfastened, are carelessly opened by strangers.' 2
'See also Fishburn v. Railway Co, 127 Iowa, 483 (i9o5), and remarks of
Elliott, C. J., in Bloom v. Ins. Co, 97 Ind. 478 (1884).
'Henry v. Dennis, 93 Ind. 452 (1883), where a passerby, seeing cows
about to drink fish-brine left in open barrels in the street by the defendant,
emptied the barrels into the gutter, where the plaintiff's cows drank it. See
also Williams v. Koehler Co., 41 N. Y. App. Div. 420 (1899), where a
stranger negligently drove back a horse which had wandered from the street
where the defendant had left it untied.
'Pullman Co. v. Bluhm, 109 Ill. 20 0884); Wallace v. P. R. R., 222 Pa.
556 (igog); the latter a case of the negligence of a physician. But see
contra, Ties v. Smuggler Mining Co., 158 Fed. Rep. 26o (i9o7), where a
miner, imperilled by the defendant's negligence, was injured by the negligence
of rescuers.

'Bohlen, "Cases on Torts," p. 290. See also Allen, J, in McCauley v.
Norcross, is5 Mass. 584 (1892).
'Lord Halsbury, quoted by Gibson, J., in Murphy v. Great Northern
Railway Co., I. R. [18971 2 Q. B. 312.
R.
_. v. Cummings, 1o6 U. S. 700 (x882); Armour v. Golkowska, 202
Ill. x44 (9o3); R. R. v. Perriquey, 138 Ind. 414 (893); Wallace v. Henderson, 211 Pa. 142 (1905).
11McCauley v. Norcross, supra, n. 8; The J.B. Thomas, 8t Fed. Rep. 578
(1897) ; Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87 (1874).
N. Y. 3T2 (T889); contra, Cole v. German Sav"Tousey v. Roberts, Itr4
But see the irreconcilable case of
ing Society, 124 Fed. Rep. 113 (903).
Stone v. R. R.. 171 Mass. 536 (x898), where the defendant company was held
not liable for storing inflammables in a freight house in violation of a
statute, where they were ignited by a match carelessly thrown by a shipper.
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But the courts have not stopped here. They have carried the
liability of the original tort-feasor to a much greater distance and
practically all jurisdictions now regard it as no excuse even that a
wilful and deliberate wrongful act has intervened, if, in fact, the
defendant could have anticipated that some interference might have
occurred." This larger conception can be traced to dicta in the
case of Collins v. The Middle Level Cornznissioners," but it has
found expression in innumerable decisions since, and has become
an unquestionable rule. In that case the defendant's negligence in
constructing a culvert created a condition which caused third persons to intervene, and by tearing down an obstruction built by the
plaintiff to protect himself, to cause the latter's lands to become
flooded. The defendants were held liable. The court was not convinced that the third persons were beyond their rights in interfering, but held, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brett,. that, assuming
that they were wrongdoers, "the primary and substantial cause of
the injury" was the negligence of the Commissioners.
But this point marks the parting of the judicial ways. Having
gone so far, many courts stubbornly refuse to advance further,
while others have allowed themselves to be carried nearer the ultimate conclusion to which their reasoning must necessarily lead
them. The difference in the positions of the American and English
courts at this point is marked, the latter having gone to much
greater lengths in enforcing the liability of the original wrongdoer.
A distinction is drawn between acts which are wrongful and deliberate, but the particular consequences of which are not intended,
and those done with evil intent and where some actual resulting
harm is intended. In the latter case many courts, especially in this
country, steadfastly refuse to give the injured plaintiff relief against
the first wrongdoer, regarding the interference as sufficient to destroy the effect o#1 the original wrongful act as an efficient cause.
It is submitted that such a distinction, at best but a matter of
degree, ig arbitrary and logically should have no effet upon the
question. Because in one case a stranger has wilfully' intervened,
but with no evil intent in his heart, while in the other lie has interfered for the express purpose of causing harm, is there; any reason.
to give the one more effect than the other upon the problem of cause
and effect? Surely the fact that one act was done in-a spirit of
mischief, the other in a spirit of malice, should not haie any ma'Of course the primary fact of negligence must be proved: in all cases.
The defendant must iave been able to have foreseen that somei intervention
might occur, though the particular form of interference need not have been
anticipated. So in Glassey v. Worcester, x85 Mass. 315 (904), the court
held the defendant company could not be expected to have foreseen that
harm would result from the leaving -of a heavy reel of wire on its side in
the highway, and could not be held liable when children righted it and rolled
it down a hilL
L RL, 4 C. P. 279 (1869).
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terial bearing upon the question. Yet such is the distinction drawn
by the courts and upon this-rock do the cases split."5
It is said that no liability should attach to one who by his
wrongful act creates a condition which affords a third person an opportunity to do a deliberate harmful act to another. While this is
fundamentally -true in most cases, it is submitted that this is primarily a question of negligence and that it should not be allowed to
cloud the question of whether such an interference is sufficient materially to disturb the chain of causation. Without negligence there
can be no liability, and the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
has been negligent toward the person actually injured, or toward a
class of society of which he is a member, but this is a matter entirely
sepa.rate and distinct from the problem of proximate and remote
cause. Depending as they do, one upon what the reasonable man
should have anticipated had he paused to reflect, the other upon the
natural sequence of causation viewed in the light of what his actually taken place, it is difficult to understand how the two can be
confused.
But to some such confusion of the underlying principles must
the attitude of the American courts be ascribed. In a case in Indiana,' where a prisoner deliberatelly threw a deputy sheriff into an
excavation negligently left in the highway, the town authorities were
held not liable, because the prisoner was an "intervening independent human agency" thus "making the party guilty of negligence in
the first instance not responsible". In a California case,T for the
same reason, the defendant was relieved from responsibility when a
child was thrown by its infuriated brother into a pond left unguarded near a place where children were known to congregate.
In these cases, which illustrate the general type of .such situations,
while the actual decision reached by the courts is probably not open
to dispute, was the defendant negligent toward the plaintiff? Had
In the following cases, though the intervening act was deliberate and
intentional, because the particular consequences were not premeditated and
planned in advance, recovery was permitted: Lynch v. Nurdin. r A. & E.
(N. S.) 29 (Eng. i84x), horse left untied, started by one in a spirit of
mischief; Engelhart v. Farrant, L R. 118971 1 Q. B. 24o. defendant liable
because driver of his cart left it in charge of another who deliberately drove
off, though told not to do so; Thompson v. Platt, 44 App. Div. 291 (N. Y.
1899), no excuse that boys, by teasing and throwing stones, started a horse
left insecurely tied by defendant; Lane v. Atlantic Works, i Mas. z36
(t872), where defendant who had negligently piled iron on his truck was

held liable when boys, who had started the truck and climbed thereoa,
knocked off the iron upon the plaintiff; True and True v. Woda, 201 IML 31S
(19o3), material, carelessly piled, thrown down by children in play; Harrison
v. K. C. Electric Co.. igs Mo. 6o6 (i9o6), circuit completed bythe plaintiff's
son cutting a wire in two; Steel Co. v. Wilkinson, 69 AtI. Rep. 412 (Md.
z9o8), horse frightened by bystanders swinging a rope left ny the defendant
across the highway; Sullivan v. Creed, I. R. [19o] 2 K. B. 317. boy thinking
a gun left by defendant in an improper place, unloaded, pointed it at a

friend.
"Alexander v. Town of New Castle, i55 Tnd. 5t (rBSS).
"Loftus v. DehAi, 133 Cal. 214 (1904).
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the defendant known that interference of a human agency in such
a manner might take place and cause harm, could it be logically
maintained then that such interference should relieve him of responsibility? Where one knows or has reason to know that his act will
give another the opportunity to do deliberate harm to another, or
even the chance to commit a wanton crime, should the fact that that
other takes advantage of the opportunity afforded him, prove a valid
excuse to the defendant? If the defendant has been negligent
toward the plaintiff in such a way, is not his act the proximate cause,
despite the interference? It is submitted that the position of the
American courts, which invariably answer this question in the negative, can not be justified on principle.
In a Georgia case,18 a lessee of convicts carelessly permitted a
negro of the lowest type to escape, but was held not liable for a rape
subsequently committed by him. In Illinois" a sheriff negligently
allowed the escape of a prisoner who was under indictment for assault with intent to murder the plaintiff, and whom he had reason
to know to be apt to renew the assault upon the first opportunity.
The prisoner did assault the plaintiff again, but the court held that
this was not proximately caused by the escape. In a case in North
Carolina2 0 the keeper of an. insane asylum who negligently discharged as cured a dangerous maniac, was held not liable for a
murder committed by him later, on the ground that the keeper's
negligence was not the proximate cause but the mere orcasion for
the homicide. These cases represent the prevailing view in this
country, though there is a decided scarcity of decisions upon. this
exact point. In all of them, the defendant has by his act knowingly
allowed another to assume a position to do harm to a third person.
By his negligence the defendant has given one of known dangerous
proclivities the chance to exercise his abnormal tendencies, the opportunity to do the very thing which the defendant should have
known lie would do if the occasion presented itself. Can it be justly
said that he should go unpunished?
The English courts have fairly met this problem. In the case
of De la Bcre v. Pearson"- the financial editor of a newspaper recommended a certain broker to a reader without proper investigation,
the broker being "outside" the exchange and an undischarged bankrupt. The defendant newspaper was held responsible for the broker's embezzlement, the court taking the view that the recommendation was the "primary and substantial cause of the plaintiff's loss of
money", even though a crime had intervened. There is also a
case in Scotland which, eight years before, laid down the same
rule.22 There the Caledonian Railway Company, by virtue of a
"Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., ioO Ga. 568 (1897).
" Hullinger v. Worrell, 83 Ill. 22 (1876).

(O).

"Ballinger v. Rader, i5i N. C. 383 (gog).
" L R.f[go7] K. B. 483.
" Marshall v. Caledonian Railway Co., x Session Cases,

5th sec., zo6o
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statute, underpinned the pursuer's premises, but negligently left
a large hole in the wall leading to the cellar, through which a- thief
entered. The defender company claimed that the thief broke the
chain of causation and cited the authority of Vicars v. Wilcocks, "
but the court refused to follow the earlier rule and found no difficulty in connecting the loss of the pursuer with the defender's negligence, despite the criminal act of the intervening third party.
With this conflict of opinion as a background, every new case
of the kind which appears at once assumes a special significance.
The curious attitude taken by the American courts makes each case
of value and in this connection it is interesting to note a recent decision of the Massachusetts court. A bishop in the Roman Catholic
Church appointed to a certain parish a priest whom he knew to be
"of vicious arid degenerate texidencies and gross sexual proclivities". Vhili in the act of a religious service a female parishioner
was ravished atithe altar, but the court refused to place the responsibility upon the bishop; 2' It was admitted by the court that desoite the-independent act of a third person, "the defendant's earlier
negligence may be found to be the direct and proximate cause of the
injurious consequences", but the extension of the rule was denied
to the case "where the independent, wrongful act that intervenes
is an atrocious crime", even if that particular crime could have been
anticipated. Had the priest merely seduced the girl, the court was
of the opinion that the bishop would have been liable, but a distinctionf was-found in the fact that the priest had committed rape. Can
such reasoning be accepted without question? The test applied
really amounts to .whether the plaintiff resisted the outrageous attempts of the priest. . She did resist; her seducer was compelled to
use force; and thereby, through the subtle workings of some inexplicable process, the bishop was relieved of any responsibility. Had
she been less able to withstand the stress of temptation the25 latter
would have been made to answer for the priest's misconduct
Such a decision might adapt itself to a system of jurisprudence
whose functionT it is to protect the wrongdoer from the full measure
of his punishment, but can it be said to fit in with the well established doctrines which form the foundation of the modern conception of tort liability?
L.B.S.
$PrS,
S'

,.

z.

'"Carini v. Beaven, ,o6 N. E. Rep. 54 (rpa4).
-See.
also the opinion of Stewart, J., in the recent case of Nirdlinger v.
American Distrkt Telegraph Co., 9t At. Rep. 883 (Pa. t9T4), where it was
held that the negligence of the defendant's employee in failing to reset a
burglar alarm was not the proximate cause-of the plaintiff's klss of goods
by theft, though the defendant company had expressly contracted.to furnis
protection in the event of burglary, the felonious entry by tae thief being
considered a sufficient interruption to wipe out any liability of the defemsdmg
company.

